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The long-term adequacy of the Belgian public pension system: 












realized  by  the  Federal  Planning  Bureau’s  semi‐aggregated  MALTESE  model.  Indeed,  MIDAS 
aligns its socio‐economic and demographic projections and its macro‐economic assumptions on 
the  2009  report  of  the  Study  Committee  for  Ageing.  The  adequacy  of  pensions  is  analysed 
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2.1.  A comparison between this version of MIDAS and the previous AIM 
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Table 1:  The actual development of some key parameters in the MIDAS model (in current prices) 
  Pension given a full career  
at the minimum right  
per career year 
minimum pension  
(single rate) 
Old age guaranteed minimum 
income (base rate) 
2003 705.94  818.39  619.37 
2004 715.30  836.80  637.77 
2005 732.04  856.39  664.24 
2006 776.33  870.66  697.63 
2007 889.63  889.53  796.78 
2008 937.95  947.34  854.73 
2009 972.69  992.67  890.04 
Notes:   (1) Monthly amounts of annual averages. (2) The old age guaranteed minimum income at single rate is 1.5 
times the base amount. A couple receives twice the base amount, so the old age guaranteed minimum income 
at single rate is 75% of the couple rate. (3) The minimum household pension at household rate is 1.25 times 
the amount at the single rate. (4) The pension after a full career with the minimum right per career year equals 







































































probit  model),  one  draws  a  random  number  uniformly  distributed  number  i u .  When 
) ( i i X u β α + <
‐1 logit   (or  ) ( i i X robit u β α + <






























gender distribution, as expressed by the stochastic component i ε , the mortality distribution for 
disabled people will be higher. 
                                                           
2   The following discussion is a summary from the latter reference.  WORKING PAPER 10-10 
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to  put  conclusions  of  this  paper  into  a  general  perspective,  the  cost  of  aging  projected  by 
MALTESE will be reminded. 






































































































the  two‐yearly  budget 2009‐2010  were introduced  in  the  2009  Study  Committee  for  Ageing 
baseline projection. As from 2011, the social policy hypotheses are based on the parameters for 
the adaptation to living standards used to calculate the budget (see above), and the benefits 
were adjusted accordingly.  WORKING PAPER 10-10 
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Table 2:   Assumptions of MALTESE for the Study Committee for Ageing 2009: a summary 
Demographic hypotheses as from 2008 (see «Population projections 2007-2060
4») 
 2007  2030           2050              2060 
Fertility rate  1.81  1.76  1.76               1.77 
Life expectancy at birth: men  77.3  81.2  84.0               85.3 
Life expectancy at birth: women  83.3  87.0  89.7               90.9 
Socio-economic hypotheses  
Educational attainment rate  Remained at the most recently observed value 
Activity rate: men   
Methodology which uses probabilities of transition from one socio-
economic category to the other for successive generations, by 
gender and age category, and including effects of reforms 
Activity rate: women 
Transition from the working status towards 
invalidity, old-age unemployment, early retire-
ment and retirement  
Macro-economic hypotheses 








growth and wage growth 
by employee 
0.01%  1.28%  Yearly productivity growth and 













62.7% Long-term  employment  rate
c 68.5% 
Social Policy hypotheses 
2009-2010  From 2011: calculation of the budget intended for the adaptations to 
living standards   
 
Current legislation: 
Rules of the social partners and the  
government  
Wage ceiling  1.25% 
Minimum right per working year  1.25% 
Welfare adjustment (employee and self-employed)
d 0.50% 
Welfare adjustment for lump-sum benefits  1.00% 
a.   Including the old-age unemployed. 
b.   In % of the population at working age (15-64 year). 
c.   At the long-term, the employment rate is the result of the projection of the labour force, in combination with the as-
sumption of the structural unemployment rate.  
d.  The welfare adjustment for pensions of the public sector (“perequatie”) is based on the wage growth minus the 
wage drift of 0.5% (observed difference in the past). Hence 1.5-0.5=1%. 






















































Table 3:   Education levels in MIDAS 
ISCED-classification  MIDAS grouped variable 
0_1  pre-primary and primary education  1 
2 lower  secondary  education  1 
3A  upper secondary level, general  2 
3B  upper secondary level, vocational or technical B  2 
3CL  upper secondary level, vocational or technical, long  2 
3CS  upper secondary level, vocational or technical, short  2 
4  post-secondary, non-tertiary education  2 
5A  first stage of tertiary education  3 
5B  tertiary non-university level  3 
5A_6 levels that correspond to both ISCED levels 5A and 6  3 




Table 4:   Observed education levels (percentages of age groups) 
  15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-54 55-64 
1  76.65 18.58 19.76 24.71 29.94 36.84 45.21 58.33 
2  23.28 61.06 39.92 38.82 37.65 34.76 30.09 23.14 
3  0.08 20.36 40.32 36.47 32.41 28.40 24.70 18.53 




















Figure 1:   Observed participation rates to age and ISCED level 
 












Table 5:   Ages of education ending 
ISCED  1 2 3 4  5/6 
Modal age of education ending  12  14  18  21  23 
Source: Own calculations based on AWG-projected education expenditures, Eurostat.  
For comparison, the below Table 6 contains the theoretical ending ages to level of education.  
Table 6:  Theoretical ending ages for level of education 
ISCED  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Theoretical age of education ending  11  13  18  n.a.  21  23 












d.  The partnership formation process 
The third demographic sub module is the partnership formation process or “marriage market”. 
The below Figure 2 describes this module.  
Figure 2:   The marriage market 
person is ‘selected’
to find a partner
“marriage market”
-link individuals
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Table 7:   Working status of the couple  
Dummies  Men’s working status  Women’s working status 
inwork1=1 (=0 elsewhere)  Not working  Not working 
inwork2=1 (=0 elsewhere)  Working  Not working 
inwork3=1 (=0 elsewhere)  Not working  Working 
inwork4=1 (=0 elsewhere)  Working  Working 
Table 8:   Education status of the couple  
Dummies  Men’s education level  Women’s education level 
Education1=1 (=0 elsewhere)  high  high  
Education2=1 (=0 elsewhere)  medium   high  
Education3=1 (=0 elsewhere)  low  high  
Education4=1 (=0 elsewhere)  high   medium 
Education5=1 (=0 elsewhere)  medium   medium  
Education6=1 (=0 elsewhere)  low   medium  
Education7=1 (=0 elsewhere)  high   low  
Education8=1 (=0 elsewhere)  medium   low  




Table 9:   Estimation results for the formation of a new partnership 



































Number of obs.  90954
Pseudo R
2  0.1090

















Table 10:   Estimation results for the choice between marriage and cohabitant 













Number of obs.  220
Pseudo R
2  0.1268




















Table 11:   Estimation results for the failure in relationship 
  Failure in marriage  Failure in cohabitation 
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Age difference  0.1430
*** 0.0703 - -
Age difference
2 -0.0088
*** 0.0057 - -
Number of children 12-15  0.6714
*** 0.2108 0.7107
*** 0.2812









Number of obs.  15226 1675
Pseudo R
2 0.0742 0.0279
Notes:   Coef. = coefficient; Std. Err. = standard error; * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Dashes indicate variables 










































































2.4.2.  Behavioural equations of the labour market module 
A first event that the labour market module simulates is whether one is chronically ill or not. 
The  probability  of  this  event  happening  depends  on  whether  the  individual  was  already 
chronically ill during the previous year, or not. 
Table 12:   Estimation results for the chronically ill status - Men 
  Chronically ill previous year  Not chronically ill previous year 









*** 0.0002 - -





Number of obs.  2870 14745
Pseudo R
2 0.0258 0.0484
Notes:   Coef. = coefficient; Std. Err. = standard error; * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Dashes  indicate  variables 














ample, if an individual ceases to be in work at 65, then he or she almost automatically becomes retired.  WORKING PAPER 10-10 
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Table 13:   Estimation results for the chronically ill status - Women 
Chronically ill previous year  Not chronically ill previous year 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
University - - -0.3372
*** 0.0782















Number of obs.  3329 16831
Pseudo R
2 0.0233 0.0623
Notes:   Coef. = coefficient; Std. Err. = standard error; * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Dashes indicate variables 














Table 14:   Estimation results for labour market participation - Men 
  In work previous year  Not in work previous year 
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
University -0.3270
*** 0.1539 -0.2423** 0.1958
Upper secondary  -0.2408
*** 0.1345 -0.3555
*** 0.1691
Ever had a job  0.7684
*** 0.2552 0.9161
*** 0.2278
Potential experience  0.0416
*** 0.0191 -0.1876
*** 0.0223
Potential experience2  -0.0026
*** 0.0003 0.0013
*** 0.0004
Chronically ill  -0.5585
*** 0.1302 -0.7686
*** 0.1892
Other inactive (lag)  - - -0.3428** 0.2147
Unemployed (lag)  - - -0.9702
*** 0.2043





Number of obs.  15395 2498
Pseudo R2  0.2018 0.3808
Notes:   Coef. = coefficient; Std. Err. = standard error; * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Dashes indicate variables 













Table 15:   Estimation results for labour market participation - Women 
  In work previous year  Not in work previous year 
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
University 0.2296
*** 0.1177 - -
Upper secondary  - - -0.1860
*** 0.1001






Newly divorced/separated  -0.6841
*** 0.3636 0.6225** 0.3798
Number of children 0-11  -0.3441
*** 0.0555 -0.3789
*** 0.0585
Number of children 12-15  - - 0.1515** 0.0933







Chronically ill  -0.3916
*** 0.1212 -0.5442
*** 0.1409
Other inactive (lag)  - - 0.1564
*** -4.0400
Unemployed (lag)  - - -0.3691
*** 0.1670






Number of obs.  13333 6390
Pseudo R
2 0.2050 0.2545
Notes:   Coef. = coefficient; Std. Err. = standard error; * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Dashes indicate variables 
not included in the model. 
Married  women  who  were  in  work  the  previous  years  and  who  have  a  university  degree, 
clearly have a higher possibility of remaining in the labour force. This probability however de‐
creases with the number of children younger than 12 in the household, with the number of 

























Table 16:   Estimation results for the unemployment status - Men 
  Unemployed previous year In work previous year  Neither in work nor  
unemployed previous year
 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef.  Std.Err.
Age -0.0883
*** 0.0403 - - - -
Chronically ill  1.1049** 1.5500 0.7578** 0.6169 - -





Number of obs.  76 136 606
Pseudo R
2 0.1346 0.0263 0.0000
Notes:   Coef. = coefficient; Std. Err. = standard error; * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Dashes indicate variables 






Table 17:   Estimation results for the unemployment status - Women 
 Unemployed   
previous year 
In work  
previous year 
Neither in work nor  
unemployed previous year
 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
University -0.5901* 0.7161 -0.5046** 0.5567 - -







Number of obs.  113 166 785
Pseudo R
2 0.0068 0.0874 0.0519
Notes:   Coef. = coefficient; Std. Err. = standard error; * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Dashes indicate variables 

























Table 18:   Estimation results for the employee status - Men 
  In work and employee previ-
ous year 
In work and not employee 
previous year 
Not in work  
previous year 
 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef.  Std.Err.
Age - - -0.0551
*** 0.0202 -0.0540
***  0.0223
University - - -1.1889
*** 0.3843 - -
Upper secondary  - - -1.8472
*** 0.5265 - -
Duration as employee  - - -0.2102





Number of obs.  1599 248 53
Pseudo R
2 0.0000 0.1242 0.1154
Notes:  Coef. = coefficient; Std. Err. = standard error; * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Dashes indicate variables 
not included in the model. 
Three different equations are also estimated for women and reported in Table 19. For women 
who  were  already  employee  the  previous  year,  the  probability  of  staying  an  employee  de‐
creases with age and increases if one previously was in the public sector and if one had a per‐
manent contract. The two other regressions for women are similar to those for men.  WORKING PAPER 10-10 
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Table 19:   Estimation results for the employee status - Women 
  In work and employee  
previous year 
In work and not employee 
previous year 
Not in work  
previous year 





Public sector  2.2244
*** 1.0362 ----
Permanent contract  1.7282
*** 0.5155 ----
University - - -2.1782
*** 0.5848 - -
Upper secondary  - - -2.0580
*** 0.5989 - -







Number of obs.  1425 140 88
Pseudo R
2 0.1372 0.2159 0.0169
Notes:   Coef. = coefficient; Std. Err. = standard error; * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Dashes indicate variables 












Table 20:   Estimation results for the public sector employee status - Men 
  In work not in public sector 
previous year 
In work in the public sector 
previous year 
Not in work  
previous year 
 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef.  Std.Err.











Duration in public sector  - - 0.0800





Number of obs.  6372 1641 1241
Pseudo R
2 0.0021 0.0339 0.0111
Notes:   Coef. = coefficient; Std. Err. = standard error; * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Dashes indicate variables 
not included in the model. 
For women, the results of the three different regressions are described next. Women who were 
not working in the public sector with the lowest educational attainment level have a lower 









Table 21:   Estimation results for the public sector employee status - Women 
  In work not in public sector 
previous year 
In work in the public sector 
previous year 
Not in work  
previous year 
 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
Age - - 0.1488
*** 0.0549 - -
Age
2 - - -0.0018
*** 0.0007 - -
University 0.8696
*** 0.2165 - - 0.6411
*** 0.1645
Upper secondary  0.7356
*** 0.2232 -0.3258
*** 0.1409 - -
Number of children 0-11  -0.2052
*** 0.0825 - - -0.2146
*** 0.1078
Duration in private sector  -0.1465
*** 0.0353 - - - -
Duration in public sector  - - 0.1690
*** 0.0370 - -
Intercept -3.0876
*** 0.2197 -1.3579*** 1.0782 -1.4157
*** 0.1168
Number of obs.  4860 2078 905
Pseudo R
2 0.0233 0.0238 0.0213
Notes:   Coef. = coefficient; Std. Err. = standard error; * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Dashes indicate variables 










Table 22:   Estimation results for the civil servant status - Men 
  Civil servant previous year  Not civil servant previous year 
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Duration as civil servant  0.6140
*** 0.3177 - -
Duration as employee  - - -0.3089
*** 0.1170
Intercept 1.4179** 0.9749 -1.3134
*** 0.6250
Number of obs.  145 280
Pseudo R
2 0.2004 0.0658
Notes:  Coef. = coefficient; Std. Err. = standard error; * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Dashes indicate variables 
not included in the model. WORKING PAPER 10-10 
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Table 23:   Estimation results for the civil servant status - Women 
  Civil servant previous year  Not civil servant previous year 
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Duration as civil servant  0.4088
*** 0.2156 - -





Number of obs.  135 384
Pseudo R
2 0.1177 0.1491
Notes:   Coef. = coefficient; Std. Err. = standard error; * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Dashes indicate variables 











Table 24:   Estimation results for the permanent contract status - Men 
  In work no permanent  
contract previous year 
In work permanent contract 
previous year 
Not in work previous year 
 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef.  Std.Err.
Age 0.1909
** 0.1043 0.2524




*** 0.0008 - -
Upper secondary  - - 0.9109





Number of obs.  277 1145 41
Pseudo R
2 0.0131 0.0390 0.0000
Notes:  Coef. = coefficient; Std. Err. = standard error; * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Dashes indicate variables 
not included in the model. WORKING PAPER 10-10 
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Table 25:   Estimation results for the permanent contract status - Women 
  In work no permanent con-
tract previous year 
In work permanent contract 
previous year 
Not in work previous year 
 Coef.  Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
Age 0.2057
**  0.1058 0.0392
*** 0.0121 - -
Age
2 -0.0033
** 0.0015 - - - -
University -  - 0.7277
*** 0.2577 - -
Upper secondary  -  - 1.2328
*** 0.2968 - -
Intercept -4.0453
** 1.8229 -0.5108** 0.5730 -1.3545
*** 0.2804
Number of obs.  376 874 78
Pseudo R
2 0.0382 0.0310 0.0000
Notes:   Coef. = coefficient; Std. Err. = standard error; * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Dashes indicate variables 










year  –  for  women  also  reflected  by  the  dummy  whether  one  worked  full‐time  –  explains 
whether or not one works the whole year.  
Table 26:   Estimation results for the “work all year” status - Men and women 
 Men  Women 








Firm size (lag)  - - 0.0007**  0.0005
Permanent contract (lag)  1.0434
*** 0.2483 1.3617
*** 0.1822
Part time (lag)  - - 0.9799
*** 0.3119






Number of obs.  1633 1484
Pseudo R
2 0.4998 0.3634
Notes:   Coef. = coefficient; Std. Err. = standard error; * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Dashes indicate variables 









Table 27:   Estimation results for the number of worked months per year - Men and women 
 Men  Women 
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Age 0.0363
*** 0.0097 - -
Age
2 -0.0004
*** 0.0001 - -




*** 0.0335 - -





Number of obs.  460 488
R
2 0.1352 0.0582
Notes:   Coef. = coefficient; Std. Err. = standard error; * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Dashes indicate variables 
















Table 28:   Estimation results for the part time status - Men and women 
 Men  Women 
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Chronic ill  2.9144
*** 1.2274 - -
Part time previous year  - - 3.6649
*** 0.2430
University - - -0.5845
*** 0.2513
Number of children 0-11  - - 0.3062
*** 0.1287





Number of obs.  1730 1574
Pseudo R
2 0.1283 0.3193
Notes:  Coef. = coefficient; Std. Err. = standard error; * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Dashes indicate variables 








Table 29:  Estimation results for the number of worked hours per week - Men and women 
 Men  Women 
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Age - - -0.0023
*** 0.0007
Part time  -0.7978
*** 0.0920 -0.6398
*** 0.0224
Public sector  -0.0467




Number of obs.  1531 1318
R
2 0.0626 0.3923
Notes:   Coef. = coefficient; Std. Err. = standard error; * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Dashes indicate variables 

















is not included into the equation. WORKING PAPER 10-10 
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Table 30:   Estimation results for the hourly wage rate - Men 
  No civil servants  Civil servants 




Upper secondary  0.0855










Number of obs.  1561 157
R
2 0.1313 0.0750
Notes:   Coef. = coefficient; Std. Err. = standard error; * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Dashes indicate variables 
not included in the model. 
Table 31:   Estimation results for the hourly wage rate - Women 
  No civil servants  Civil servants 












*** 0.0001 - -
Part time  0.0925




Number of obs.  1406 143
R
2 0.0992 0.1870
Notes:   Coef. = coefficient; Std. Err. = standard error; * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Dashes indicate variables 





Table 32:   Estimation results for the size of the firm - Men and women 
 Men  Women 









*** 0.0526 - -
Intercept 5.9146** 83.4177 5.6366*** 23.0931
Number of obs.  1729 1573
R
2 0.0203 0.0372
Notes:   Coef. = coefficient; Std. Err. = standard error; * = p<0.10; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01. Dashes indicate variables 
not included in the model. 
Before closing this section, it has to be reminded that some transitions are not based on behav‐
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finally, social assistance benefit. WORKING PAPER 10-10 
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immigration means we to a certain degree overestimate demographic ageing. WORKING PAPER 10-10 
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taking married and cohabiting individuals together.  WORKING PAPER 10-10 
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of married individuals. This is shown in Figure 5.  WORKING PAPER 10-10 
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This  can  also  be  observed  through  Figure  6  plotting  the  average  number  of  individuals  in 
households.  This  is  continuously  decreasing  over  time.  As  explained  above,  the  increasing 
number of cohabitations, that leads more often than with marriage to a separation, creates an 
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tion is assumed to remain roughly constant over time.  WORKING PAPER 10-10 
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Figure 10:  Working status distribution by gender, in percent 

































is applied separately for men and women (see section 2.2.2).  WORKING PAPER 10-10 
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14   Especially many employees working in the public sector become civil servants somewhere during their career.  WORKING PAPER 10-10 
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Table 33:  Problems and cope strategies in the analysis of pensions 
  Problem 2: mixed careers  Strategy 2.1  Strategy 2.2 
Problem 1: current retirees    Take benefits from various 
systems together 
Limit the analysis to those 
that did not make a transition 
between being an employee 
and a civil servant. 
Strategy 1.1  Separate current and  
future retirees 
  
Strategy 1.2  Do not separate current  
and future retirees 
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to be in education, and hence an increasing age of entering the labour market.  WORKING PAPER 10-10 
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(those  who  have  worked  only  as  civil‐servants)  and  ‘pure’  wage‐earners  (those  who  have 























relative to wages. WORKING PAPER 10-10 
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Figure 18:  Gross earnings and simulated retirement benefits for civil servants with pure career, 































2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Year
Earnings - Men Earnings - Women
Retirement benefits - Men Retirement benefits - Women
Source: MIDAS
 








pensions are paid at the household rate. This is illustrated by Figure 20 below.  WORKING PAPER 10-10 
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Figure 19:  Gross earnings and simulated retirement benefits for wage earners with pure career, 
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between the “household rate” pension and the “single rate” pension of the spouse.  WORKING PAPER 10-10 
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3.3.2.  Adequacy of social security in Belgium.  










































separate a trend for men and women. These trends are added to the figure.  WORKING PAPER 10-10 
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b.  Inequality: The Gini index 
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The proportion of income source k in the total income inequality (Pk) is then calculated as:  






Table 34:  Contributions of different income components k to income inequality among pensioners 
 S k Gk Rk Pk
Year: 2003 
 Pension benefits  0.8480 0.2546 0.6049 0.6623
 Income from work  0.1282 0.8953 0.6177 0.3594
 Other income  0.0238 0.9348 -0.1920 -0.0217
Total income  0.1972
Year: 2010 
 Pension benefits  0.8153 0.2657 0.6052 0.6006
 Income from work  0.1621 0.8714 0.6419 0.4154
 Other income  0.0225 0.9401 -0.1643 -0.0159
Total income  0.2183
Year: 2020 
Pension benefits  0.8331 0.2616 0.6686 0.6489
 Income from work  0.1459 0.8848 0.6447 0.3706
 Other income  0.0210 0.9413 -0.2216 -0.0195
Total income  0.2245
Year: 2030 
 Pension benefits  0.8900 0.2229 0.7141 0.7089
 Income from work  0.0935 0.9301 0.6874 0.2991
 Other income  0.0165 0.9551 -0.1014 -0.0080
Total income  0.1998
Year: 2040 
Pension  benefits  0.9541 0.1891 0.8603 0.9434
 Income from work  0.0351 0.9696 0.3147 0.0652
 Other income  0.0107 0.9719 -0.1354 -0.0086
Total income  0.1646WORKING PAPER 10-10 
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 S k Gk Rk Pk
Year: 2050 
Pension  benefits  0.9608 0.1805 0.8518 0.9504
 Income from work  0.0332 0.9735 0.3277 0.0681
 Other income  0.0060 0.9854 -0.4874 -0.0186
Total income  0.1555
Year: 2060 
 Pension benefits  0.9547 0.1862 0.8010 0.8540
 Income from work  0.0406 0.9735 0.6877 0.1631
 Other income  0.0047 0.9874 -0.6194 -0.0171




















































development  of  inequality  of  income  over  time  is  more  discontinuous  for  these  categories, 
which is due to the lower number of individuals in these categories. Nevertheless trends let ap‐
pear that the level of inequality of disabled is always slightly lower than the level of inequality 






men and women.  WORKING PAPER 10-10 
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   2003  2004  2005  2006 
  EU_silc  9324  9942  10316  10540 
  MIDAS  8727  9085  9282  9573 
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2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Year
 Total population - Men  Total population - Women
 Retirees - Men  Retirees - Women
Source: MIDAS
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2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Year
 Total population 50%  Retirees 50%
 Total population 60%  Retirees 60%




















25) that were in households that have an equivalent income between 50 and 60% of the median WORKING PAPER 10-10 
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